| Message ID | DU0PR03MB9567EEB5404C31C4A4AE7EF3ECEE2@DU0PR03MB9567.eurprd03.prod.outlook.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [FFmpeg-devel,1/6] lavf/tls_mbedtls: handle more error codes for human-readable message | expand |
| Context | Check | Description |
|---|---|---|
| yinshiyou/configure_loongarch64 | warning | Failed to apply patch |
| andriy/configure_x86 | warning | Failed to apply patch |
On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 10:34:41AM +0200, Sfan5 wrote: > We manually check the verification status after the handshake has completed > using mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(). However with VERIFY_REQUIRED > mbedtls_ssl_handshake() already returns an error, so this code is never > reached. > Fix that by using VERIFY_OPTIONAL, which performs the verification but > does not abort the handshake. > > Signed-off-by: sfan5 <sfan5@live.de> > --- > libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c | 3 ++- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c b/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c > index 9508fe3436..67d5c568b9 100644 > --- a/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c > +++ b/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c > @@ -263,8 +263,9 @@ static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int > flags, AVDictionary **op > goto fail; > } > + // not VERIFY_REQUIRED because we manually check after handshake > mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&tls_ctx->ssl_config, > - shr->verify ? MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED : > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE); > + shr->verify ? MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL : > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE); > mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&tls_ctx->ssl_config, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, > &tls_ctx->ctr_drbg_context); > mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(&tls_ctx->ssl_config, &tls_ctx->ca_cert, > NULL); This patch looks corrupted by extra line breaks [...]
Am 18.05.24 um 21:53 schrieb Michael Niedermayer: > On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 10:34:41AM +0200, Sfan5 wrote: >> We manually check the verification status after the handshake has completed >> using mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(). However with VERIFY_REQUIRED >> mbedtls_ssl_handshake() already returns an error, so this code is never >> reached. >> Fix that by using VERIFY_OPTIONAL, which performs the verification but >> does not abort the handshake. >> >> Signed-off-by: sfan5 <sfan5@live.de> >> --- >> libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c | 3 ++- >> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c b/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c >> index 9508fe3436..67d5c568b9 100644 >> --- a/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c >> +++ b/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c >> @@ -263,8 +263,9 @@ static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int >> flags, AVDictionary **op >> goto fail; >> } >> + // not VERIFY_REQUIRED because we manually check after handshake >> mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&tls_ctx->ssl_config, >> - shr->verify ? MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED : >> MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE); >> + shr->verify ? MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL : >> MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE); >> mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&tls_ctx->ssl_config, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, >> &tls_ctx->ctr_drbg_context); >> mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(&tls_ctx->ssl_config, &tls_ctx->ca_cert, >> NULL); > This patch looks corrupted by extra line breaks > > [...] Thanks for pointing that out. It looks like years later Microsoft is still incapable of leaving patches intact... Will send as attachments for v2.
diff --git a/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c b/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c index 9508fe3436..67d5c568b9 100644 --- a/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c +++ b/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c @@ -263,8 +263,9 @@ static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags, AVDictionary **op goto fail; } + // not VERIFY_REQUIRED because we manually check after handshake mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&tls_ctx->ssl_config, - shr->verify ? MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED : MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE); + shr->verify ? MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL : MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE); mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&tls_ctx->ssl_config,
We manually check the verification status after the handshake has completed using mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(). However with VERIFY_REQUIRED mbedtls_ssl_handshake() already returns an error, so this code is never reached. Fix that by using VERIFY_OPTIONAL, which performs the verification but does not abort the handshake. Signed-off-by: sfan5 <sfan5@live.de> --- libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &tls_ctx->ctr_drbg_context); mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(&tls_ctx->ssl_config, &tls_ctx->ca_cert, NULL); -- 2.45.1